Ideas from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' by E.J. Lowe [2000], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' by Lowe,E.J. [CUP 2000,0-521-65428-9]].

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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic

6653	Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change

6618	A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs

6635	Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique

6619	Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining'

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism

6643	'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation

6638	One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form

6644	Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information

6647	Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

6639	The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception

6640	A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external

6645	If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory

6637	How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially?

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

6667	There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism

6642	Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind

6641	Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind

6617	The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness

6626	'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight

6646	The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons

6665	Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain

6670	If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection

6671	It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'

6666	All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I'

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism

6625	If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique

6621	You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room

6654	A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique

6623	Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion

6628	Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties

6629	Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism

6622	Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

6634	Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

6630	Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought

6648	Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality

6652	'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background

6651	People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence

6655	The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge

6657	Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test

6656	The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods

18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content

6636	The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory

18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth

6633	Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical

19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions

6632	The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

6631	If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory

6659	The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

6661	Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

6662	We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions

6663	People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes